A necessary and sufficient condition in terms of a de Finetti style representation is given for a probability function in Polyadic Inductive Logic to satisfy being part of a Language Invariant family satisfying Spectrum Exchangeability. This theorem is then considered in relation to the unary Carnap and Nix-Paris Continua.
Introduction
This paper extends [15] by proving the converse of the main theorem (Theorem 1) of that paper and in so doing gives a complete characterization of the language invariant probability functions in polyadic inductive logic which satisfy spectrum exchangeability. Before that however we need to explain the context in which these results are set and the three 'rational principles' relevant to this paper, namely; constant exchangeability, spectrum exchangeability and language invariance. Readers already well familiar with these notions may confidently skip straight to the section on characterizing language invariance with spectrum exchangeability.
In common with recent developments in Inductive Logic, see for example [18] (and [2] , [3] , [4] for the classical approach), we shall work within a first order predicate language L with finitely many relation symbols, countably many constants a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . . but no equality nor function symbols. The intention here is that these constants a i exhaust the universe. Let SL, QF SL respectively denote the sentences and quantifier free sentences of L.
We say that a function w : SL → [0, 1] is a probability function on L if it satisfies the following conditions for all θ, φ, ∃x ψ(x) ∈ SL : (P1) If θ then w(θ) = 1 (P2) If ¬(θ ∧ φ) then w(θ ∨ φ) = w(θ) + w(φ) (P3) w(∃x ψ(x)) = lim n→∞ w( n i=1 ψ(a i )) (P1) and (P2) are the standard axioms for a probability function. (P3) is the Gaifman axiom (see [6] ) capturing the intention that the a i exhaust the universe and that in consequence ∃x ψ(x) should be equated with the infinite disjunction ∞ i=1 ψ(a i ). Throughout w, possibly with various annotations, will denote a probability function on L and, for the purposes of motivation, we shall be thinking of probabilities in the sense of de Finetti as subjective degrees of belief.
By a theorem of Gaifman (see [6] , where in fact the axioms (P1-3) were first formulated) any probability function defined on QF SL (i.e. satisfying (P1) and (P2) for θ, φ ∈ QF SL) extends uniquely to a probability function on L. In this sense then we can largely limit our considerations to probability functions defined just on QF SL. Indeed, by the Disjunctive Normal Form Theorem it then follows that w is determined simply by its values on the state descriptions, that is sentences of the form where the b i are distinct constants from L (i.e. choices of a j ) and P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m are the relations of L with arities r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m respectively.
In Inductive Logic we are basically interested in the choice of probability functions w on L when these are intended to represent the beliefs, i.e subjective probabilities, assigned by a rational or logical agent in the absence of any prior knowledge. The key restraint here is that this assignment should be rational or logical and it is customary to identify this with the requirement that w satisfies certain 'rational' or 'common sense' principles. A number of such principles have been suggested in the literature, see for example [2] , [3] , [4] , [8] , [9] , [13] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [20] , [23] but as far as this paper is concerned we shall be interested in just three. The first of these is that beliefs (i.e. assigned subjective probabilities) should not treat any of the constants a i differently, in other words that they should be freely inter-substitutable or exchangeable:
The Constant Exchangeability Principle, Ex
For θ, θ ∈ QF SL, if θ is obtained from θ by replacing, respectively, the (distinct) constant symbols
Henceforth we shall assume without further mention that all our probability functions satisfy Ex. In practice this often allows us to simplify expressions by taking the constants involved to be just an initial segment of the list a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . ..
In order to explain our next principle we first need to introduce some notation. Given a state description Θ(b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ) where the b i are distinct constants from L we say that b i , b j are indistinguishable mod Θ, written b i ∼ Θ b j , if for any relation P (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x r ) of L and any t 1 , . . . , t r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the sentence P (b Define the spectrum of Θ, denoted S(Θ), to be the multiset 1 of sizes of the (nonempty) equivalence classes with respect to ∼ Θ .
The Spectrum Exchangeability Principle, Sx
Clearly expressed in this form Sx implies Ex.
In the early accounts of Inductive Logic, for example [2] , [3] , [4] , [9] , the language L was taken to be purely unary 2 , that is the predicates of the language were just P 1 (x), P 2 (x), . . . , P m (x). In this case state descriptions have the simple form
1 Equivalently, we could define the spectrum as the vector of sizes of the (non-empty) equivalence classes in non-decreasing order, as was our fashion in some early papers.
2 [10] and more particularly [12] were later exceptions to this trend.
where the α h (x), h = 1, 2, . . . , 2 m are the atoms of L, that is formulae of the form
and Sx reduces to Atom Exchangeability, Ax, asserting that
depends only on the multiset of |{i | h i = j}| for j = 1, 2, . . . , 2 m .
It appears that the principle Ax was acceptable to Johnson and Carnap and the earlier investigators since it follows from Johnson's Sufficientness Principle 3 which they advocated.
The last principle which we shall be concerned with here is that of Language Invariance. The motivation behind this principle is that whilst we may at any one time be interested in some particular finite language L a rational choice of beliefs for that language should be capable of being rationally extended to a larger language. After all there is clearly no reason to suppose that there are only finitely many relations in existence and that L has already included all of them.
Language Invariance
The probability function w on L satisfies Language Invariance 4 if there exist a class of probability functions w L for each finite predicate language 5 L such that whenever L is a sublanguage of L then w restricted to SL equals w L (w L SL = w L ) and w L = w.
In this case we shall describe the w L as a language invariant family containing w. We shall say that w satisfies Language Invariance with Sx if w is a member of a language invariant family all of whose members satisfy Sx.
6
In the next section we shall derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a probability function to be member of a language invariant family satisfying Sx.
3 See for example [20] or [22] for a formulation of this Principle in the notation of this paper. 4 This differs from the earlier definition of Language Invariance given in [8] and [20] which was restricted to purely unary languages L, L .
5 As usual with constants a i and no equality nor function symbols. 6 Given w satisfying Sx it would be nice if the members of any language invariant family containing w must also satisfy Sx. This is easily seen to be true below L but it is not clear whether or not it must also hold above L.
A Characterization of Language Invariance with Sx
Before stating and proving the main result of this paper we need to introduce a particular family of probability functions u
and endow B with the standard weak product topology inherited from [0, 1] ∞ . Let
For a state description Θ we will define u p L (Θ) as the probability that Θ is arrived at by a process involving picking (with replacement) balls of different colours from an urn, and building up state descriptions in a certain way depending on which colour balls, which 'colours' for short, are chosen. The urn contains a special black ball (referred to as number 0) which has probability p 0 of being picked and other, non-black colours (referred to as numbers 1, 2, . . .) with probabilities p 1 , p 2 , . . . of being picked. 
. . , b q ) so that when i, j ≤ q are such that 0 = c i = c j then we have b i ∼ Θ + b j (giving each such possible extension equal probability).
7 Finally let j p (Θ + , c + ) be j p (Θ, c) times the probability as described of going from Θ, c to Θ + , c + .
Note that the above definition implies that j p (Θ, c) must be zero when c i = c j = 0 and
By a straightforward generalization of the result in [18] (where just two colours were considered) u p L satisfies Sx (and hence also Ex).
Theorem 1 Let the probability function w on L satisfy Sx. Then w satisfies language invariance with Sx if and only if there is a measure µ on the Borel subsets of B such that for θ ∈ SL,
Furthermore in this case if L contains at least one non-unary relation then this language invariant family containing w is unique.
We call µ as in this theorem a de Finetti prior of w.
Proof. Assume that (1) holds and for a language L and for φ ∈ SL set
in other words w L has the same de Finetti prior as w, but the language has changed. Since the u p L satisfy Sx, so do the w L and it is fairly straightforward to show (for a proof see [15] ) that these w L form a language invariant family including w.
Turning to the other, main, direction suppose now that w is part of a language invariant family. Let s be large, let y be the member of this family whose language is L together with s additional unary predicates P i (x) and let v be the restriction of y to L = {P 1 (x), . . . , P s (x)}. Fix z much less than s, let L = {P 1 (x), P 2 (x), . . . , P z (x)} and let α i range over the atoms of L .
By de Finetti's Representation Theorem, [5] , [7] , there is a countably additive measure ν s on the Borel subsets of
which is invariant under permutation of coordinates such that,
where, to simplify the notation, we have assumed that the only atoms that appear in this conjunction are α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α r and that m j = |{i | g i = j}| for j = 1, 2, . . . , r.
Expanding these innermost brackets we obtain
where u = u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u r , u j = u j1 , u j2 , . . . , u jk j , the u j1 , u j 2 . . . u jk j are greater than zero with sum m j = |{i | g i = j}| and ρ is a mapping from
Since ν s is invariant under permutation of coordinates we obtain from (4) that
where the u is as before but now ρ is now simply an injective mapping from
Let us now leave the measures ν s for a moment and return to the functions u p L defined earlier. We will consider them for p from the set
From the definition of these functions we can see that for
where
• ρ is an injective mapping from
where the u, ρ are as in (5). Now, using ν s , we define a countably additive measure µ s on the Borel subsets of B s as follows.
Notice then that since ν s is invariant under permutations of coordinates, from
From (5) and (8) we have that
Hence since (for fixed z)
and the integrals here are bounded and the number of summands fixed,
The aim now is to show how the limit in (9) can be moved inside the integral sign.
Let
and endow H with the standard weak product topology inherited from [0, 1] ∞ . As a closed subset of [0, 1] ∞ H is compact.
Any µ s on B s ⊂ B as above defines a measure µ
Since
is continuous on H. By (9) and (10) it follows (see, for example, [1] ) that
Now h is a bijection from H to B and h −1 = b maps Borel sets of B to Borel sets of H. Hence µ H h −1 defines a measure µ on B and we have
Note that the construction of µ does not depend on n and z and that (12) holds whenever L is a unary language with atoms α i and v on L ⊇ L is the member of the given language invariant family containing w.
Hence to complete the proof it is enough to note that µ defines a language invariant family that agrees with the given one containing w on unary languages, and to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Let {U L } and {V L } be two language invariant families families satisfying Sx which agree on unary languages. Then they agree on all languages.
Proof. Let n ∈ N. First we need to define a well founded ordering on the class of equivalences ∼ on n individuals {a 1 , ..., a n } ∼ 1 ¢ ∼ 2 ⇐⇒ ∼ 1 is a refinement of ∼ 2 .
We give this rather technical result in the Appendix
When Θ( a), Φ( a) are state descriptions, we will write
Fix L to be a unary language with more than n atoms α i .
Let L be some language. First we will show, by induction on ∼ Φ , that U L∪L (Φ( a)) = V L∪L (Φ( a)) for all state descriptions Φ( a) in the language L∪L on n individuals. Let Φ be such that ∼ Φ consist of singletons (so ∼ Φ is the least element w.r.t. ¢) and let Ψ( a) be any state description in the language L ∪ L extending
Then ∼ Ψ( a) must again be this minimal element and U L∪L must take the same value on all such extensions as on Φ( a) by Sx. Hence, since
where the summation is over state descriptions Ψ( a) in L∪L extending n i=1 α i (a i ), we see that if M is the number of such Ψ( a) then for any one of them
This value is also U L∪L (φ( a). Noting that this reasoning also applies to the language invariant family {V L }, that U L = V L and that M depends only on L and L, we conclude that
holds in this base case.
where the Ψ( a) range over state descriptions in L ∪ L extending n i=1 α h i (a i ). Now for all of these Ψ( a), ∼ Ψ is less or equal ∼ Φ in the ordering ¢, and some Ψ( a) with ∼ Ψ =∼ Φ do appear on the right hand side of this expression. Furthermore the identity (14) also holds with V in place of U , and by the inductive hypothesis the terms on the right hand side are the same except possibly for those involving the Ψ( a) with ∼ Ψ =∼ Φ . But since the left hand sides are the same (as U L = V L ), the right hand sides must also be the same. Hence by Sx, U L∪L (Φ) = V L∪L (Φ) as required.
Since for Θ( a) a state description in the language L we have
where the Ψ( a) range over state descriptions in L ∪ L extending Θ( a), and similarly for V , the lemma now follows.
Finally for L containing at least one non-unary predicate uniqueness follows as above by induction on ¢, see [15] for a proof. (As we shall demonstrate by an example in the penultimate section uniqueness can fail if L is purely unary.) Theorem 1 shows that the probability functions on L which are part of a language invariant family satisfying Sx are precisely those with a representation of the form (1). This raises the question which probability functions on L have such a representation.
By the main Representation Theorem in [14] any homogeneous probability function w satisfying Sx on a language with at least one non-unary relation has such a representation as in (1), where: 1 ,a 2 ,...,ar))|=k w(Θ (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a r )) = 0
where the Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a r ) range over the possible state descriptions of a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a r in L. In other words the probability that all the a i will fall in some fixed finite number of equivalence classes with respect to indistinguishability is zero.
As opposed to homogeneous w is t-heterogeneous if lim r→∞ |S (Θ(a 1 ,a 2 ,...,ar))|=t w(Θ (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a r )) = 1.
In other words the probability that all the a i will fall in some t (non-empty) equivalence classes with respect to indistinguishability is 1.
By a result in [18] every probability function w satisfying Sx can be represented 9 as a sum
The representation is unique up to the w [t] for which η t = 0.
where ∞ t=0 η t = 1, the η t ≥ 0, w [0] is homogeneous and the w [t] are t-heterogeneous. As shown in [15] a t-heterogeneous w is language invariant just if t = 1. On the other hand mixtures of t-heterogeneous probability functions may be language invariant, for example by (1) if p has exactly t non-zero entries then u p L is language invariant, and indeed, according to the above representation in this case, η 0 = 0 and for 1 ≤ j ≤ t, η j is the proportion of state descriptions Θ (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) such that |S (Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) )| = j. 10 
An Application
In the past two parameterized families of purely unary probability functions have been introduced, namely the c m λ of Carnap's continuum (see [3] ) and more recently the Nix-Paris w δ m (see [17] ), as the unique solutions -on a unary language with n predicates -of arguably rational requirements. Both these families (for fixed λ, δ) satisfy language invariance at least as far as purely unary languages are concerned. Furthermore in both cases these probability functions satisfy Sx, i.e. Atom Exchangeability Ax in this case, as it is usually termed in the unary case. (Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n )) = 2
where 2 m γ + δ = 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) is a state description on a unary language with m predicates P 1 (x), P 2 (x), . . . , P m (x) with spectrum the multiset of non-zero r i .
In this case the corresponding de Finetti prior on B is given by the discrete measure which puts all the measure on the single point
Furthermore it follows from Lemma 2 and the proof of Theorem 5 in [21] that in this case the language invariant family of which w δ m is a member is unique. [j] appear rather less straightforward to describe, see [13] .
it is defined by c m λ (Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n )) =
for Θ (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) as above.
In this case the de Finetti prior on B giving the family of c m λ has been elucidated by Kingman, the corresponding distribution being the so called Poisson-Dirichlet distribution for parameter λ, see [11] , and for a complementary discussion Zabell's [23, Chapter 10] . This is a particularly interesting distribution since in the unary case the c m λ for 0 ≤ λ ≤ ∞ are characterized as the only probability functions additionally satisfying Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, see [9] , or, for a formulation in the notation of this paper, [8] . However, as shown in [22] , beyond the purely unary the natural generalization of Johnson's Sufficientness Principle has only two solutions, corresponding to λ = ∞, the 'completely independent' probability function, and λ = 0, the sole 1-heterogeneous probability function. This raises the question of whether there is some version of Johnson's Sufficientness Principle which does characterize these extensions of the c m λ also above the purely unary. Unfortunately the Poisson-Dirichlet distributions are somewhat inaccessible (see [11] , section 3.3.6) and we are not aware of any satisfactory answer to this problem in terms of the observance of a particular principle within Inductive Logic.
Concerning the case of λ = 2 we remark that the probability function c To see this note that (writing d i for
• γ = {γ (1, 1) , ..., γ (1, k 1 ), γ(2, 1) , ..., γ(2, k 2 )} where {γ (1, 1) , ..., γ(1, k 1 )} is a partition of {1, ..., m 1 } and {γ (2, 1) , ..., γ(2, k 2 )} is a partition of {m 1 +1, ..., m 1 +m 2 }.
• ρ is an injective mapping from { j, f :
where k, γ, ρ are as above except that the range of ρ is {1, 2, ..., N }.
(where ρ has range {1, ..., N }), as can be seen if we imagine
written out as the sum of (m 1 + m 2 )-long products observing the order in which the entries are taken from ( i∈A
respectively. Any such product uniquely corresponds to a k, γ, ρ (γ(1, 1) being the set of i for which i-th entry of the product of the i∈A 1 d i is the same as the first, d ρ(1,1) being this first entry etc.) and due to the d i not really appearing, there are 2 N −(k 1 +k 2 ) of partitions A 1 , A 2 whence any such product arises.
Since there is a one to one correspondence between the subsets of { , . . . , , . . . ,
It is easily proved that this limit is the same as
However it can be checked that for L 2 having 2 unary predicates (so 4 atoms),
so we have here two different language invariant families but having a common member on L 1 .
Appendix
Lemma 3 Let L = {P 1 (x), P 2 (x), . . . , P z (x)} be a unary language and let α i range over the atoms of L . For any a state description
is continuous on H.
Proof.
As in the main proof, to simplify the notation, we assume that the only atoms that appear in this conjunction are α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α r and we denote |{i | g i = j}| = m j for j = 1, 2, . . . , r.
and G ∈ N. Note that for i > G we must have x i < G −1 since there can be at most G of the x i greater or equal G −1 . Let
First we shall show the following claim:
where C is a constant independent of G.
We have
• γ = {γ (1, 1) , ..., γ(1, k 1 ), γ(2, 1), ..., γ(2, k 2 ), ..., γ(r, 1), ..., γ(r, k r )} is a partition of {1, 2, ..., n} such that {γ(j, 1), ..., γ(j, k r )} is a partition of {i :
Note that the number of k, γ over which the sums are taken is finite and determined by the m 1 , ..., m r . Consider a fixed k, γ and assume j 0 , f 0 is such that γ(j 0 , f 0 ) > 1. Then the sum, over all distinct choices of the ρ with ρ(
is less than C 0 G −1 for some constant C 0 since it is bounded by
Hence the overall contribution summing over all k, γ, from those ρ for which some ρ(j, f ) > G when γ(j, f ) > 1 is less than some C 1 G −1 with C 1 independent of G. It follows that (18) changes by at most
Analyzing (18) in more detail, we note that each ρ splits into ρ 1 and ρ 2 according to the image being greater than 0 and less or equal to G, or not, Taking this into account we can write (18) as
where k, γ and ρ = ρ 1 ∪ ρ 2 are as in (18) and
Above, we have seen that requiring that γ(j, f ) = 1 for all j, f ∈ Dom(ρ 2 ) changes (18) by at most C 1 G −1 . Hence with this further condition on ρ 2 (18) is within
This can be written as
Now consider a fixed D 2 . The sum To prove the lemma, first note that for each G ∈ N, f restricted to the set H G = {y ∈ H : y i = 0 for all i > G} is uniformly continuous when viewed as a mapping from this set with the usual metric inherited from R G to R. Let η G be the corresponding constant satisfying 
Let y
0 ∈ H and > 0. Let G be such that G −1 < 3C and let U be the neighbourhood of y 0 in H consisting of those y ∈ H that are within 3Gη G of y 0 on the first G coordinates, i.e. max{|y i − y 0 i |; i = 1, 2, ...G} ≤ 3Gη G . Then 
Conclusion
Since both Sx and Language Invariance are (we would claim) desirable principles in the context of assigning beliefs in the absence of any prior knowledge it is pleasing to have an equivalent description of such probability functions in terms of the particularly simple functions u p L . This furthermore opens the possibility of deriving certain other properties of such functions by moving the onus of the task onto the much more malleable u p L , examples of which will be given in the forthcoming [14] .
In addition we have applied the proof of this main representation theorem to show how to extend the continua of Carnap and Nix-Paris from purely unary languages into the polyadic whilst maintaining spectrum exchangeability.
